Antonia Garcia v. Newtown Township by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-22-2012 
Antonia Garcia v. Newtown Township 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Antonia Garcia v. Newtown Township" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 959. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/959 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3190 
_____________ 
 
ANTONIA GARCIA, 
                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEWTOWN TOWNSHIP; JOSEPH CZAJKOWSKI;  
THOMAS JIRELE; ROBERT CIERVO; PHILLIP CALABRO;  
MICHAEL GALLAGHER; JERRY SCHENKMAN; 
sued individually and jointly, held liable jointly and individually 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-09-cv-03809 
District Judge: The Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge 
 
(Filed: May 22, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
                                                 
The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United 
States District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________                              
      
 
STEARNS, District Judge. 
 
 Antonia Garcia appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to 
Newtown Township, her former employer, and the Township Manager,1 
pretermitting Garcia's claims of unlawful employment discrimination based on 
race, sex, and age, in violation of various federal and state anti-discrimination 
statutes,2 and her claim of First Amendment retaliation.  Finding no error, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s order. 
BACKGROUND3 
 In June of 2007, Garcia was hired by then-acting Township Manager John 
Boyle as his administrative assistant.  The offer letter, which Garcia signed on June 
30, 2007, stated that the “position is classified as an exempt, salaried position 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had earlier dismissed the Board of Supervisors as 
defendants in their individual capacities.  Garcia does not appeal the dismissal.  
   
2
 The claims included violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for first amendment 
retaliation (Count I), violation of procedural due process (Count II), and a Monell 
(v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)) claim (Count 
III); Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) violations 
(Count IV); and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) violations (Count V).   
 
3
 As we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we recount the material 
facts in the light most favorable to Garcia as the nonmoving party.  See Harrison 
Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2005).  We do, 
however, consider credible evidence submitted by the moving party that is 
essentially uncontradicted.  See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 
259, 271-272 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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under the terms of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.”  J.A. at 181.  The letter 
further stated that “you will be expected to read and understand Part 7 of the 
Newtown Township Administrative Code of 2000, titled the „Employee Relations 
Manual.‟. . . A copy of this document is enclosed.”  Id. at 182-183. Part 7E, 
Section 9 of the Manual stated as follows. 
It is the policy of the Township that all employees who do not have a 
written employment agreement or do not work under a labor 
agreement or contract, are employed at the will of the Township for 
an indefinite period.  Employees may resign from the Township after 
proper notice and may be terminated by the Township at any time, for 
any reason, with or without notice. . . . Nothing contained in this 
manual, employee handbooks, employment applications, Township 
memoranda, employment letters or other materials provided to 
employees in connection with their employment shall restrict the 
Township‟s right to terminate an employee at any time or for any 
reason.  These documents shall not create an express or implied 
contract of employment for a definite period. 
 
Id. at 136. The first few months of Garcia‟s employment were uneventful. She 
learned her job duties and responsibilities and made friends with co-workers.  
Among them was Pat Davidson.  At Davidson‟s invitation, Garcia joined Davidson 
and Boyle on several occasions for after-work drinks.  In January of 2008, having 
come to suspect that Davidson and Boyle were having an affair, Garcia told 
Davidson that she no longer wanted to socialize after work.  She explained to 
Davidson that she “didn‟t feel right about it . . . [b]ecause they were both married.”  
Id. at 830.  After this rebuff, the friendship cooled.   
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Around this time, Joseph Czajkowski was hired as the permanent Township 
Manager, and Boyle reverted to his position as Assistant Manager.4  Boyle had 
applied for the Manager‟s job, and Garcia believed that he was bitter at having not 
been selected.  Following the rejection, Boyle began to make “life difficult” for 
Garcia.  Id. at 831.  According to Garcia, this included constant reminders that he 
was still “the boss,” repeated invasions of her personal space, fixed stares, the 
“silent treatment,” the denial of training opportunities, assigning her work during 
her lunch hour, and on one occasion, pointing his finger in her face and screaming 
“when I tell you to do something you do it.”  Id. at 831-832.  She also recounts an 
occasion when Czajkowski asked her to “put something on the website,” a task that 
she believed was Boyle‟s responsibility.  When Boyle refused Garcia‟s request that 
he do the posting instead, Czajkowski, who had overheard the conversation, yelled 
over to Boyle, “just do it.”  Garcia claims that Boyle silently mouthed the word 
“bitch” at her.  Id. at 831.  
 Matters escalated further when Boyle complained about Garcia to 
Czajkowski.  In an email dated March 20, 2008, entitled “Personnel Issue - Toni,” 
Boyle criticized Garcia‟s job performance in a number of respects, including her 
                                                 
4
 According to Garcia, soon after Czajkowski started on the job, he asked her 
the origin of her last name.  She told him her father was born in Spain (although 
her mother is of Anglo-Saxon heritage).  Czajkowski responded “you can cause a 
lot of trouble with that name.”  Id. at 856.  
 
5 
 
failure to “make her boss‟s priorities her priorities.”  Czajkowski testified that he 
also received complaints about Garcia from other employees, including Elaine 
Gibbs, the Finance Director,5 Bill Wert, a former department head,6 and Kathleen 
Kimble,7 another employee.  Id. at 491.  According to Czajkowski, the complaints 
were about “her being difficult to work with.”  Id. at 492.  In January of 2008, 
during an annual review, Czajkowski gave Garcia a one-percent raise instead of the 
four-percent raise awarded to most other Township employees.   
In April of 2008, Garcia asked to meet with Czajkowski.  According to 
Garcia, Czajkowski began the meeting by telling her that she was a “disruptive 
employee.”  Id. at 834.  Garcia began to cry and said that she was under stress 
because of Boyle‟s and Davidson‟s harassment.  Czajkowski asked if she wanted 
to make a formal complaint.  Garcia declined, but afterwards contacted a Township 
Supervisor, Jerry Schenkman, and arranged to meet with him later that afternoon.   
                                                 
5 Garcia admitted to having had a personality conflict with Gibbs, and 
conceded that in an email she sent to Lisa Russo, the former administrative 
assistant, she called Gibbs “a bitch.”  Id. at 893.  
6 A memo from Wert to Czajkowski dated July of 2008 identified two 
incidents in which Garcia “became flustered, defensive, combative and 
argumentative which created a difficult working environment to complete tasks.”  
Id. at 193.  
7 Asked about her personal conflict with Kimble, Garcia testified, “[s]he was 
just mean. . . . She just wasn‟t a nice person.”  Id. at 841.  
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Garcia complained to Schenkman about Czajkowski, Boyle, and Davidson, and 
also told him that Czajkowski and Boyle were frequently absent from work.8  
In May of 2008, Czajkowski presented Garcia with a written memorandum 
entitled “Job Performance.”  The memorandum identified “goals and objectives” 
for Garcia and emphasized the need for the “timely and professional provision of 
administrative services.”  Id. at 194.  The memorandum continued: 
[y]our main duties are to carry out the directives of the Township 
Manager and Assistant Township Manager. . . . Much of the work 
performed by you is seen by the Board of Supervisors and the general 
public.  Therefore it is essential that everything be checked and 
rechecked for correct form and detail.  Please work to ensure that 
documents and packets that are sent to the board and public are free of 
errors and that all appropriate documentation is provided.  We are not 
a large office and I require a work place environment characterized by 
respect and dignity . . . please . . . afford all department heads the 
respect demanded of their positions.  I also understand that this 
position can carry with it a level of stress.  Please let me know should 
you need assistance with dealing with any job related stress as the 
Township does have an employee assistance program available to 
you.  We will have a follow up meeting in (90) ninety days to further 
discuss measurement of our goals and your performance.  Please feel 
free to speak to me at any time regarding work or performance issues. 
 
Id.
9  Garcia states that Czajkowski ordered her to keep “things internal” when he 
gave her the evaluation.  Id. at 885. 
                                                 
8
 Schenkman took no action on Garcia‟s complaints. 
 
9
 In July or August of 2008, Garcia complained to Czajkowski that other 
employees were being offered training classes that were not offered to her.  She 
testified that, in response, Czajkowski screamed, “You‟re always looking for 
commies under the bed.”  Id. at 850.  
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 In September of 2008, Czajkowski terminated Garcia‟s employment.  Garcia 
requested a hearing before the Board of Supervisors, but one was never held.10  
Garcia also filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.  Garcia was replaced by a 
woman from a temporary employment agency, who was eventually offered full-
time employment by the Township.  Garcia‟s replacement was in her thirties.  
Garcia was fifty-one years old when she was terminated. 
 In August of 2009, Garcia brought this action in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  In December and January of 2010, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  In late March of 2011, Garcia filed a motion to 
supplement the record with additional evidence, which was denied.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment to defendants on June 9, 2011.11  
DISCUSSION 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10
 The Employee Manual states that “[e]mployees not subject to labor 
agreements may request a hearing of the Board of Supervisors as described in this 
Administrative Code, in the event of a suspension in excess of 10 working days 
and dismissal.  Board of Supervisors decisions in such matters are final.”  Id. at 
135. 
 
11
 The District Court initially granted summary judgment to all defendants 
on all claims with the exception of the First Amendment retaliation claim against 
Czajkowski.  On a motion for reconsideration, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Czajkowski on the retaliation claim as well. 
 
8 
 
 Our review of the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Sloan & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 653 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2011).12  
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates that there is no 
“genuine dispute as to any material fact.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A material fact is 
a fact that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  For an issue to be 
genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed 
factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties‟ differing 
versions of the truth at trial.” Id. at 249 (citation omitted).  “If the non-moving 
party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, „the moving party may meet its burden 
on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party‟s evidence is 
insufficient to carry that burden.‟”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 Claim of Retaliation for Engaging in Protected First Amendment Activity 
The District Court specified the three instances of alleged protected activity 
on which Garcia based her First Amendment retaliation claim: (1) her refusal to 
socialize with Boyle and Davidson after work; (2) her complaints to Schenkman 
                                                 
12
 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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and Ted Schmidt13 that Czajkowski and Boyle were “never . . . at work”; and (3) 
her complaints to Schenkman and Schmidt that Czajkowski had failed to 
investigate the harassment of her by Boyle and Davidson.  The District Court held 
that the instances cited by Garcia did not constitute protected speech, or had not 
been shown to have played a causative role in her termination.  We agree. 
 To make out a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Garcia must show: 
(1) that [she] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendants‟ 
retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness 
from exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.  
A defendant may defeat the claim of retaliation by showing that it 
would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not engaged 
in the protected activity. 
 
Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267 (citations omitted).  See also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).  The showing of causation is critical. 
Summary judgment will be granted on a First Amendment retaliation claim where 
there “is simply no basis in the evidence” to make the causal link.  Lauren W., 480 
F.3d at 272.  
 A reviewing court must first determine whether the expression at issue was 
in fact protected speech.  Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
13
 Schmidt and Garcia were neighbors and often walked their dogs together.  
Schmidt had no connection with Township government. 
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1993).  The determination is a matter of law.  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 
F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 2006).  In the government employee context, the 
consideration is two-fold.  First, the court must determine the capacity in which the 
government employee was acting when the speech was uttered.  When employees 
are speaking in their official capacities, they “are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).  
Second, if the employee is speaking in a private capacity, the court must determine 
whether her speech implicated a First Amendment “matter of public concern.”  Id. 
at 423; see also Hill, 455 F.3d at 241-242. “Whether an employee‟s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and 
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”  Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983).  Matters of inherent concern to the public include 
official malfeasance, abuse of office, and neglect of duties.14  See Holder, 987 F.2d 
at 195.  On the other hand, internal complaints about workplace management and 
matters that are articulated solely because of their personal effect on the employee 
                                                 
14
 When a public employee‟s speech touches on a matter of public – as 
opposed to workplace – concern, any response by the employer to that speech is 
subject to a balancing test weighing the interest of the employee in speaking freely 
against the interest of the employer in preserving workplace discipline and 
ensuring the efficient delivery of public services.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 418-419 (2006); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 
563, 568 (1968). 
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are not protected speech.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  See also Foraker v. 
Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 238-243 (3d Cir. 2007) (abrogated on other grounds by 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)); Spiegla v. Hull, 371 
F.3d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 908 (7th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 Garcia‟s complaints to Schenkman and Schmidt about her discomfiture over 
what she suspected was an extramarital liaison between Boyle and Davidson, and 
her frustration at Czajkowski‟s failure to vigorously investigate her complaints of 
harassment, involved internal workplace matters and personal grievances that 
clearly fall outside the sphere of First Amendment protection.  Garcia‟s complaints 
about Czajkowski‟s and Boyle‟s workplace absences, suggesting as they do 
possible malfeasance on their part, might be seen as standing on firmer ground.  
However, we do not dwell on the possibility, as we agree with the District Court 
that Garcia made no showing that Czajkowski knew of her private conversations 
with Schenkman and Schmidt, much less their contents.15  See Ambrose v. Twp. of 
Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is only intuitive that for 
                                                 
15
 Garcia‟s complaints to Schenkman about her superiors‟ lax work habits, to 
the extent that she sought Schenkman out in his capacity as a Township 
Supervisor, might well fit within the category of nonactionable Garcetti speech.  
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.  See also Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a public employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain 
of command at his workplace about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in the 
course of performing his job.”). 
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protected conduct to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision, the 
decision-makers must be aware of the protected conduct.”).16 
Violation of Due Process/Property Interest 
 Garcia does not contest the District Court‟s finding that she did not have a 
protected due process property interest in her job.  See Biliski v. Red Clay Consol. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 574 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]n at-will employee 
has „no property interest‟ in [his or her] job sufficient to trigger due process 
concerns.”) (citation omitted).  Garcia instead presses the argument that because 
the Township Employee Manual mandated that claims of harassment be 
investigated, and in her case no investigation occurred, she was denied her right to 
procedural due process.17  The argument lacks merit.  The Manual does state that 
“Newtown Township will investigate all reports of prohibited harassment.”  J.A. at 
129.  However, the Manual defines “prohibited harassment” as offensive conduct 
based on “sex, age, race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, sexual 
                                                 
16
 We need not address Garcia‟s contention that the District Court erred in 
rejecting her §1983 claim against the Township under Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 
Because Garcia cannot show that a constitutional violation occurred, she cannot 
demonstrate that any constitutional violation was authorized, sanctioned, or 
condoned on the part of the Town or its officials.  See City of Los Angeles v. 
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).  
 
17
 While the District Court did not address the procedural due process 
argument, it was raised by Garcia (if only tangentially) in the proceedings below, 
and we consider it preserved.   
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preference, and any other protected classification.”  Id. at 128.  When Garcia 
complained to Czajkowski that Boyle and Davidson were “harassing her,” she did 
not claim that their conduct fell within any of the prohibited categories.  At most 
the record suggests that Garcia was the victim of personal animosities and petty 
office politics (much of which she appears to have invited by her constant feuding 
with her co-workers). 
Employment Discrimination Pursuant to Title VII, the ADEA,18 and the 
PHRA
19
 
 
We agree with the District Court that Garcia failed to produce evidence 
sufficient to discredit the Township‟s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for her 
termination.  Garcia‟s principal argument on appeal is that the District Court erred 
by proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas (v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)) 
framework after she had provided direct evidence of gender and racial animus.20  
                                                 
18
 Garcia does not challenge the District Court‟s dismissal of her age 
discrimination claim.  Garcia set forth no evidence suggesting that age was a 
determinative factor in her termination.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2343, 2350-2351 (2009).  
 
19
 “Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII 
claims.”  Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
same burden-shifting framework is also used in § 1981 and § 1983 cases.   See 
McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 826 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
20
 We need not address Garcia‟s sex-based hostile work environment claim 
at any length.  “Hostile work environment harassment occurs when unwelcome 
sexual conduct unreasonably interferes with a person‟s performance or creates an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 
14 
 
Garcia is generally correct that the McDonnell Douglas paradigm does not apply in 
the face of direct evidence of discriminatory animus.  See Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).  Direct evidence may take the form of a 
workplace policy that is discriminatory on its face, or statements by decision 
makers that reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the adverse 
employment decision.  As a practical matter, “only rarely will a plaintiff have 
direct evidence of discrimination.”  Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 
578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).   
Direct evidence does not include stray remarks that are made in a context 
unrelated to the employment decision, particularly if they are remote in time.  See 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 767 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, 
Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992).  See also Fakete v. 
Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002).  Boyle‟s mouthing of the word 
“bitch” under his breath, and Czajkowski‟s statement that Garcia had the ability to 
“cause a lot of trouble” because of her last name, are the sort of off-hand and 
temporally remote comments that fall well short of direct evidence of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
251 F.3d 420, 425-426 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  “[T]he harassment must 
be so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of the victim‟s employment 
and creates an abusive environment.”  Id. at 426.  There is no evidence in the 
record that Garcia was the object of unwelcome or derogatory sexual conduct 
while she was employed by the Township. 
15 
 
discriminatory animus.21  See Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 513 
(3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (remarks that are “unrelated to the decisional 
process itself are not direct evidence”).22  
We also reject Garcia‟s fallback argument that even under McDonnell 
Douglas she should have prevailed.23  She challenges the veracity of the 
explanation proffered by defendants of the non-discriminatory reasons for her 
                                                 
21
 Garcia also states that shortly after she arrived at the Township, she 
complained to Boyle (who had hired her) that she had overheard some employees 
saying that “Mexicans are dirty.”  Compl. ¶ 51.  Boyle told her that the employees 
were “just kidding,” and took no further action.  The derogatory statements are not 
attributed to Boyle.  Nor was he shown to have been involved in Czajkowski‟s 
decision to terminate Garcia some sixteen months later.    
 
22
 Garcia attempts to inject into the record a comment that she attributes to 
Charles Patton, a friend and disgruntled former Township Police Chief who she 
concedes was “still kind of angry at [Township officials] so he has nothing really 
nice to say about them.” According to Garcia, Patton told her that he had been 
present at a Township meeting in the spring of 2008 where he overheard 
Czajkowski use a gender-specific slur to describe Garcia and another woman.  We 
do not consider unsworn third-party hearsay of sufficient weight to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment.  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
 
23
 The burden shifts to the employer under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework only after a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination.   
This first step requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she is a member of a protected 
class; (2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she was fired from that position; (4) 
“under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such 
as might occur when the position is filled by a person not of the protected class.”  
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-411 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal 
citations omitted).  See Smith, 589 F.3d at 691 (“Throughout this burden-shifting 
exercise, the burden of persuasion . . . remains on the employee.”) (citation 
omitted).  We will assume, as did the District Court, that Garcia satisfied her not 
very onerous burden of showing a prima facie case.    
 
16 
 
termination,24 but presents no evidence to demonstrate any “weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the 
Township‟s explanation such “that a reasonable factfinder could rationally . . .  
infer „that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.‟”  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (internal citations omitted).25 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
                                                 
24
 Garcia objects to the District Court‟s reliance on the emails exchanged 
between Czajkowski and Boyle highlighting their increasing dissatisfaction with 
Garcia‟s performance and her personality conflicts with co-workers.  She 
complains that because she was not privy to the emails, she was unaware that 
Czajkowski was displeased with her performance.  This is beside the point.  See 
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1216 (3d Cir. 1988)) (“The 
company is under no obligation to warn plaintiff of complaints regarding his 
performance and, if anything, the effect of such evidence is equivocal, perhaps 
indicating that plaintiff was receiving the benefit of the doubt.”). 
 
25
 We briefly address Garcia‟s contention that the District Court improperly 
refused her permission to supplement the record with the unsworn affidavit of 
Patricia Purks, a former Township employee, after all discovery had closed and 
after the motions for summary judgment had been filed.  There was no abuse of 
discretion.  See DeLong Corp. v. Raymond Int’l, Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1140 n.5 & 
cited cases (3d Cir. 1980) (“Other courts have similarly declined to receive 
affidavits not submitted in a timely fashion.”) (overruled on other grounds by 
Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981)).  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(4).   
